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that the term "secondarily liable" was not used in its technical sense but was merely
intended to indicate those persons whose liability on an obligation is other than that of
principal debtor.
There appear to be no reasons of policy for excluding co-makers from Section io3.
Contract clauses spelling out the liability of the principal debtor indicate that it makes
little real difference to loan companies whether the obligation is secured by a co-maker
or by another type of surety.19 In view of the many variations on the suretyship relation, however, loan companies ordinarily designate utncompensated security parties as
co-makers since this type of surety is specifically and narrowly defined by statute,20 and
confusion and uncertainty is thus avoided. But this mere convenience in terminology
should not lead to a substantial difference in result and should not bar accommodation
makers from the group protected by Section io3. Furthermore, when it is considered
that a compensated surety may be protected by Section 1o3, it becomes even more
difficult to support a result whereby an accommodation maker, who by definition derives no benefit from the obligation incurred, is not protected. And finally, the practice of interpreting the act liberally- justifies the inclusion in Section io3 of all persons
who, though not named, are situated similarly to those specifically covered.

Taxation-Immunity from Sales Tax of Contractors under Construction Contracts with United States-[United States].-On the order of "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee"
contractors the plaintiff, an Alabama lumber dealer, sold building materials to be used
in the construction of an army camp in the same state. Pursuant to a state statute' imposing a tax on the gross retail sales price of tangible personal property, the plaintiff
was assessed on the basis of these sales. The assessment was protested, the United
States intervened on behalf of the plaintiff, and an appeal was taken to the state courts.
On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of Alabama,
held, that the immunity of the Government implied from the Constitution did not
extend to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractors,' since they and not the United States
Government had purchased the materials; and that the plaintiff could have exacted
the tax from the contractors and is therefore subject to the assessment, despite the
fact that under the construction contract the Government had agreed to pay all costs
(193 i), states that, "The contracts of the surety, guarantor and indorser are all accessory, but
the former is primarily liable while the two latter are only secondarily liable."
'9 Thus, for example, the instrument involved in Modem Industrial Bank v. Zaentz, 177
Misc. 132, 135, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 969, 973 (Munic. Ct. 194), provides that ".... the undersigned
shall .... provide such additional co-makers, guarantors or sureties as shall be satisfactory
to the holder .... that the holder thereof may accept other co-makers, guarantors, sureties .......
20Note 8 supra.

21Dietz v. Treupel, 184 App. Div. 448, 17o N.Y. Supp. ioS (x918); Griswold v. Cady, 27
N.Y.S. (2d) 302 (S. Ct. 194), noted in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 304 (1941) (§ IO3 extended to protect
a wife who was jointly liable with her husband, a soldier, in a negligence action).
x Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1941) tit. 51, §§ 752-86.
'This conclusion is inferred from the Court's opinion. See discussion accompanying notes
21 and 22 infra.
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of the contractors, since Congress had not granted them immunity from state taxation. Alabama v. King & Boozer.3
The doctrine of implied governmental immunity from taxation4 has been in great
confusion since the recent Supreme Court case of Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe.5
That decision, concerned with the immunity of the salary of an employee of the HOLC
from state income taxes, is open to several interpretations. First, the test for granting
immunity might be whether the tax, by the wording of the statute, is imposed on the
Government rather than on the person-a test of directness. 6 From the Court's statement that the income tax "is measured by income which becomes the property of the
taxpayer,"7 it may follow that these employees are to be classified with private contractors,' whose property is not impliedly immune from taxation.9 This interpretation
3 62 S. Ct.

43

(1941).

4The doctrine is usually traced to the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.

(U.S.) *316 (i8ig); see Conlon, Express or Implied Exclusions from Consumption ExcisesTypes of Consumers, 8 Law and Contemporary Problems 594, 6o3 et seq. (1941). But see

Nichols, The Relation between the Power of Taxation and the Power of Destruction, 20 Boston U. L. Rev. 435, 436, 439-40 (194o), where the doctrine is traced to Weston v. Charleston,
2 Pet. (U.S.) *449 (1829).
5 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
6This test was first stated by the Court in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
149, i6o (1937), where a tax on the gross income of a private contractor working for the

Government was upheld, although it was recognized that the actual burden of the tax could
be shifted to the Government.
7

Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (i939).

8The Court indicated that employees and contractors are alike, in that both "deal" with
the Government, when it stated that it is not enough to invalidate a tax "that the expenses of
the one government might be lessened if all those who deal with it were exempt from taxation
by the other." Ibid., at 483 n. 3.
9The Court early distinguished between taxation upon the governmental operation of a
governmental agent and taxation upon the property of the agent. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
4 Wheat. (U.S.) *316, *436 (i81g). This distinction-was later applied using the terms "governmental" and "proprietary" in cases involving taxes on railroads which, because of agreements with the Government, were said to be "governmental agents" and therefore free from
state taxation upon their governmental operations but not upon their property. Railroad
Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. (U.S.) 5 (1873); Thomson v. Pacific R., 9 Wall. (U.S.) 579 (1869);
cf. Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931), restricted to its particular
facts in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S.

134, 151

(1937). The "governmental-pro-

prietary" distinction has been completely abandoned, but the railroad cases are analogous, on
their facts, to more recent contractor cases where the Court implies no tax immunity even
though the tax is passed on to the Government through increased costs. James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S.
466 (1934), rehearing den.
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U.S. 6o4 (1934); Baltimore Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.

Baltimore, i95 U.S. 375 (x9o4). A wholly owned governmental instrumentality, however,
can have only governmental interests and is immune from state taxation. Federal Land Bank
v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 S. Ct. 1 (i94i); Pittman v. HOLC, 308 U.S. 21 (1939); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Philipsborn and Cantrill, Immunity from Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities, 26 Georgetown L. J. 543, 544 n. 3 (I938). But see United States v.
Brown, 41 F. Supp. 838,840 (Fla. 1941). Immunitywas accorded to a private corporation which
produced planes only for the Government during the first World War. Clallam County v.
United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923); cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Com'n, 153 Kan. 712, 113 P.
(2d) 110 (1941). This holding can be distinguished from private contractor cases on the ground

RECENT CASES
seems to indicate that the Court has abandoned its traditional classification of such
employees as governmental instrumentalitiesxo Second, the Court has indulged in
language of economic burden,", implying that the 'test is whether the incidence of the
tax is, as a matter of fact, on the Government. Under this view Government employees
must retain their instrumentality status inasmuch as the Court has refused to apply the
incidence test in a case involving private contractors.- And third, the Graves case is
open to the interpretation that the Court will no longer recognize constitutional immunity for governmental instrumentalities."3 Although the Court there recognized an
immunity for the HOLC to the extent of the specific statutory grant, it said that "its
real property is subject to tax to the same extent as other real property,"4 presumably
because the real property was not included in the congressional grant of immunity, and
despite the fact that property of the Government has always been held free from tax.s'"
More specifically as regards instrumentalities, the Court said that the "silence of Congress implies immunity no more than does the silence of the Constitution."' z6 Pitlnan
v. HOLC17 may strengthen this view, for it may well be argued that the Court in that
case would not have found for the first time that Congress had power to grant tax immunity to the HOLC when the operation taxed would clearly have been within the
doctrine of constitutional immunity, 8 unless that doctrine were no longer accepted.19
Since the Court has often indicated that in tax immunity matters there is no distinction between Government and governmental instrumentality 20 it would follow that if
that, though privately owned, all corporate business was in the interest of the Government or
in the exercise of a governmental function.
10Collector v. Day, ii Wall. (U.S.) 113 (1870); New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves,
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U.S. 401 ('937) [both overruled in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 466, 486
(x939)]; Dobbins v. Com'rs, x6 Pet. (U.S.) *435 (x842).

Ix ". ... the only possible basis for implying a constitutional immunity from state income
tax of the salary of an employee of the national government or of a governmental agencyis that
the economic burden of the tax is in some way passed on so as to impose a burden on the national government tantamount to an interference by one government with the other in the
performance of its functions." Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 466, 481 (1939).
Z2
"But if it be assumed that the gross receipts tax may increase the cost to the Government, that fact would notinvalidate the tax." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
z6o (937).
23 Nichols, op. cit. supra note 4, at 445-46.
'4 Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 466, 479 (i939).
'sVan Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); Lee v. Osceola & Little River Road
Improvement District, 268 U.S. 643 (1925). But cf. United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274
(94i), noted in 40 Mich. L. Rev. 290 (194).
,6 Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 466, 48o (939).
7 308 U.S. 21 (I939), noted in 39 Col. L. Rev. 418 (i939); 38 Mich. L. Rev. 738 (1940).
X8The tax was on the recording of mortgages, an operation which was necessary to the
proper functioning of the HOLC and, therefore, a governmental operation. Note 9 supra.
'9 The Pittman case may mean only that there was no need to imply a constitutional immunity since Congress had granted immunity to the HOLC which the Court has long indicated that Congress has the power to do. Thomson v. Pacific R., 9 Wall. (U.S.) 579, 588-89
(1869); see Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 411 n. 1 (1938).
"0The Court has said ". ... all activities of government constitutionally authorized by

Congress must stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional immunity from taxation."
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 3o6 U.S. 466, 477 (1939); see Pittman v. HOLC, 308
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instrumentalities have no immunity apart from statutory immunity, the Government
itself has none. Constitutional immunity would thus be entirely replaced by the doctrine that immunity can be created only by Congress.
By granting certiorari in the instant case, the Court eliminated this confusion at
least to the extent of assuming a constitutional immunity from state taxation for the
Federal Government. The Government did not even argue that the contractors were
general agents or instrumentalities of the United States ;21 the question considered by
the Court was whether cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts constitute the Government or the
contractors the "real" purchasers. This consideration was relevant only on the assumption that, if the Government itself was the real purchaser, a buyers' sales tax could not
be imposed. A buyers' sales tax would be permissible, however, if the contractors were
the purchasers even though the actual burden of the tax were ultimately borne by the
Government.22 If the Court had not operated on this assumption, it would not have
entered into so minute a consideration of the terms of the contract for the purpose of
determining the real purchasers. The instant case reaffirms the doctrine that at least
a tax placed directly on the Government will be declared unconstitutional.
The instant case does not, however, eliminate the confusion in regard to the tax immunity of governmental instrumentalities. If the Court is to be taken at its word that
there is no distinction between Government and governmental instrumentality23 there
must also bea constitutional immunity for instrumentalities. It is not impossible, however, that the Court recognizes a distinction between Government and instrumentality,24 the former operating under a constitutional immunity, the latter being immune
only when Congress specifically grants an immunity. Such a doctrine would be difficult
to apply, however, and would necessitate an arbitrary classification of functions.2s
U.S. 21, 32 (i939); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524 (1926). It has made no distinction between taxes on sales to the United States Army, the Department of the Interior, the
TVA, the Coast Guard, or a Veterans' Hospital, and has treated all as being taxes upon sales
to the United States. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), both overruled in Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62
S. Ct. 43, 45 (1941).
21 The Court agreed that they were not instrumentalities. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62
S. Ct. 43, 45 (1941). Cf. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Trinityfarm
Construction Co. v. Grosjean,'291 U.S. 466 (1934).
- There can be no doubt in the instanf case that the Government must pay the tax, since
it must pay all the costs of the contractors. There may have been some doubt whether the
Government would ultimately pay the tax in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S.
466, 48o et seq. (1939).
23

Note

20

supra.

This may not be the only instance of such a distinction; cf. Keller & Keifer v. RFC,
306 U.S. 381 (1939), where, perhaps under special circumstances, a federal instrumentality is
said not to be free from suit unless Congress says so; it is presumed, however, that the Government itself remains free from suit. Pritchett, The Paradox of the Government Corporation,
i Public Administration Rev. 381, 385-86 (1941).
25 The difficulty of classification is illustrated by post exchanges, located at Army and Navy
posts and created by direction of the secretaries of the departments under authority conferred
by Congress. Conlon, op. cit. supra note 4, at 6o7-8. These exchanges have been held to be
governmental instrumentalities and therefore immune from a state license tax. United States
v Query, 37 F. Supp. 972 (S.C. 1941), aff'd per curiam 121 F. (2d) 631 (C.C.A. 4th 1941), cert.
24

den.

62 S. Ct. 295 (194i).
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The Federal Government wishes to circumvent these state sales taxes without extending the principles of tax immunity now established. More recent contracts have
not allowed for state and local taxes, though earlier ones did,2 6 and department heads
have attempted to claim immunity for the contractors, 7 thus indicating that the War
and Navy Departments hope to avoid such taxes. 2 8 The Treasury and the Department of Justice, however, have been seeking in general to restrict the immunity doctrine,29 presumably in the hope of soon being allowed to tax income from state and
municipal bonds.3o Any exemption3l as large as that desired by the War and Navy Departments would, however, create a strong feeling in the states that their bonds should
remain free from taxation. Thus the various departments appear to be working at
cross purposes.
But if circumvention is sought, at least three possible methods are available. First,
even under the present contracts the Government, if it so desires, can furnish the contractors with materials, and, to take advantage of the Government's constitutional
immunity, the War and Navy Departments themselves could make the desired purchases. Second, since a major point of the Court's decision rested on the fact that the
Government was not bound to pay the costs at the time of the contractors' purchases, a
removal of this objection by allowing the contractors to bind the Government conclusively32 would perhaps be sufficient to constitute the Government the "real" purchaser
26 Conlon, op. cit. supra note 4, at 6o8.
27 Prior to the instant case in which Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936), and Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), were overruled, Alabama v. King
& Boozer, 62 S. Ct. 43, 45 (1941), the War and Navy Departments and the Comptroller of
the United States treated these cases as still having effect, although they were restricted to
their specific facts in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). United States
Navy Department, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Some Commentaries on "Cost-Plus-a-FixedFee" Contractors 17 (1940).
28 It was estimated that these taxes would amount to $137,000,000 in x942. Brief for the
United States in the United States Supreme Court, Alabama v. King & Boozer, App. B, at
25-26. Since the estimate was made before this country entered the war, itis undoubtedlylow.
29,39 U.S. Att'y Gen. Ops. (Op. 85) 4-6 (Aug. 5, I939); cf. S. T. 914, 1941-I Cum. Bull. 458.

3o It has been suggested that there is a way open to Congress to tax these securities if it so
desired. Powell, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1213 (1940).
But in 1933 Cordell Hull, then Senator, apparently thought a constitutional amendment necessary. Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities, 22 Geo. L. J. 1 (1933).
3' That this exemption would be an innovation is evidenced by several cases in which state
courts have upheld the application of taxes on sales to contractors for governmental purposes,
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Com'n, 153 Kan. 712, 113 P. (2d) 110 (194r); Standard Oil Co. v.
Fontenot, 4 So. (2d) 634 (La. 1941); Standard Oil Co. v. Lee, 145 Fla. 385, 199 So. 325 (1940),
and to governmental instrumentalities, Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 7o N.D.
607, 297 N.W. 42 (i941), rev'd 62 S. Ct. 1 (i941); Federal Land Bank v. DeRochford,'69 N.D.
382, 287 N.W. 522 (x939); Western Lithograph Co. v. State Board of Equalization, xx Cal.
(2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731 (1938), indicating that the states dislike the immunity. The Alabama
court alone has not allowed collection of the tax. King & Boozer v. State, 3 So. (2d) 572
(Ala. I941), rev'd 62 S. Ct. 43 (194i); United States v. Curry, 3 So. (2d) 582 (Ala. 1941),
rev'd 62 S. Ct. 48 (1941).
32 It is believed that the statutes authorizing cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts do not prohibit
o
this. 53 Stat. 59 , 591 (939), 34 U.S.C.A. § 556 (Supp. 1940); 54 Stat. 676, 712 (2940), 41
U.S.C.A. §§ 129-32 (Supp. i94o). The present contract, however, did not permit the con-
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"andguarantee immunity. Third, although there is a limit beyond which Congress cannot go in granting immunity,33 the work being carried on by these contractors is so vital
to the needs of the Government that, since Congress could presumably create a governmental agency for the task,34 it could likewise constitute these contractors governmental instrumentalities and grant them specific tax immunity.3s It would be possible
however, for the states to thwart the Federal Government's efforts at tax avoidance by
changing from a buyers' to a sellers' sales tax3 6 since, as the present case establishes,
the test for governmental immunity is whether the tax is placed "directly" on the
Government. The tax would probably be shifted to the buyer, but the fact that Government costs might be increased "would not invalidate the tax,"37 and a tax which constitutes the seller a taxpayer instead of a mere tax collector, as he is under a buyers'
tax,38 is sufficiently indirect to preclude governmental immunity.39

Torts-Duty of Landlord toward Invitee or Licensee--[England].-The plaintiff,
paying a business visit to a tenant, was injured when the elevator in the defendant
tractors to bind the Government to pay. Before the Government became liable for the costs
the approval of a Contracting Quartermaster was required.
33 Limitation on the taxing power "cannot be so varied or extended as seriously to impair
either the taxing power of the government imposing the tax or the appropriate exercise of the
functions of the government affected by it." Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 524
88
(1926); see Thomson v. Pacific R., 9 Wall. (U.S.) 579, 5 (1869).
34 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat.
(U.S.) 738 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) *316 (i8ig)..
35 Statutory immunity was denied to these contractors when the House refused to enact the
Senate's amendment allowing the Secretary of the Navy to denominate contractors agents of
the United States for purposes of the contract and to avoid all taxes. 86 Cong. Rec. 7518-19,
7527-35, 7648 (x940). Under Pittman v. HOLC, 308 U.S.

21

(1939), such a grant would seem

valid, since the function is essentially governmental. The Court has indicated that Congress
has power under the Constitution to grant a broader immunity than would be implied from the
Constitution alone. Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575, 58i (1928); Thomson
v. Pacific R., 9 Wall. (U.S.) 579, 589 (I869); see Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 411 n. i
(1938).
36"Sales taxes" take two legal forms: i) sales taxes technically upon the purcser, the

seller being considered merely a collector for the state, and 2) occupation, license, or privilege
taxes upon the seller measured by his sales. Philipsborn, Jr., The Illinois Supreme Court and
the Retailers' Occupation Tax, "3iIll. L. Rev. 741 (i937). A bare majority of the states have

sellers' taxes. Brief for the United States in the United States Supreme Court, Alabama v.
King & Boozer, App. B, at 29 et seq. The Alabama tax is a buyers' tax. King & Boozer v.
State, 3 So. (2d) 572, 578 (Ala. 1941). A use tax could not be changed from a buyers' to a
sellers' tax because it falls on the purchaser, and the states could not thwart the Government's
avoidance of use taxes. Cf. Curry v. United States,
37

James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,

302

62 S.

Ct. 48 (1941).

U.S. 134, 16o (1937).

38 Note 36 supra.

39 A sellers' tax was apparently approved by the Court in the instant case when it specifically overruled Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936), and Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi
ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), note 20 supra. Cf. Western Lithograph Co. v. State Board
of Equalization, ii Cal. (2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731 (1938).

